ID cards, data bases, and the (police) state

There's an ever so cheery article about new high-tech ID cards in the New Statesman :

"Public opinion likes the idea of ID cards because it seems like the ultimate solution to all known problems," says Brian Gladman, retired director of strategic electronic communications at the Ministry of Defence. "But actually, the way this bill is designed enables a police state. You're not going to be allowed to opt out of having an ID card, the linked databases make detailed tracking feasible, and a system with this combination of complexity and scale is way beyond the state of the art. It won't be reliable or safe. Anybody with access to the database will be able to target anybody. It's horrendous what you'll be able to do."

The National Identity Register...is meant to work like this.

You will be summoned (with up to a £2,500 fine for non-attendance) to visit a clerk, who will take your biometrics: the iris pattern in your eye, a fingerprint and a digital photograph. They will go into the system along with your name and other information, and you will hand over £85 and get a passport, ID registration number and card. From that moment, every use of your card will be automatically added to your government record, or "audit trail", whether it's at the social security office, your bank, Sainsbury's, the sexual health clinic, your office or on the way to your Alcoholics Anonymous meeting. Over time, a detailed and permanent account of your activities will build up.

The state will own this information. You won't get to see it, but it will be available to the police, the Inland Revenue, other public bodies and any commercial concerns the Home Secretary chooses. These visitors won't leave their own audit trail saying that they've called. We won't know who is observing us.

This isn't really news. Just think of what an oppressive government can do with this stuff. And if you think the Bush Administration is bad, Bob Herbert , why aren't you railing against this stuff?